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Nathan A. Burke 
 
In Murr v. Wisconsin, the Court redefined how to determine 
private property for a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment. 
Previously, courts have primarily relied on state property principles to 
determine the relevant unit of property for a regulatory takings claim. 
However, in this case, the Court adopted a three-factor standard to 
determine the landowner’s reasonable expectations regarding the 
treatment of their property. By relying on these factors rather than only on 
state laws, the Court created a litigation-specific definition of property that 
could potentially differ from state property boundaries. The three-factor 
standard may also give the government an unfair advantage in regulatory 
takings claims by considering state interests more than once in a takings 
analysis.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The appellants in Murr v. Wisconsin were four siblings in the Murr 
family (“Murrs”).1 The appellees were the state of Wisconsin (“State”) and 
St. Croix County (“County”).2 This case arose from state and local rules 
on the sale of land where the Murrs’ property was located.3 The rules 
prevented the Murrs from selling their adjacently owned lots separately.4 
The Murrs sued the State and the County arguing that the rules effected a 
regulatory taking by depriving the Murrs of all of the use of one lot because 
it could not be sold separate from the other lot.5 The Circuit Court of St. 
Croix County granted summary judgement to the State, determining that 
the Murrs had not been deprived of all use of their property.6 The Circuit 
Court concluded that the state and local property rules effectively merged 
the two lots and, under this regulation, the Murrs’ property could still be 
used and sold as a single lot.7 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed 
the decision.8 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals 
in this decision, but changed the method for defining the relevant property 
boundaries when doing a takings analysis.9 Instead of automatically 
relying on state and local rules to define property boundaries, the Court 
determined the relevant property to a takings analysis by examining three 
factors: (1) the state and local laws, (2) the physical characteristics of the 
                                                 
1.  Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (2017).  
2. Id. at 1941. 
3.  Id.  
4. Id. at 1940. 
5.  Id. at 1941. 
6. Id. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Id. 
9. Id. at 1949. 
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property, and (3) the effect the regulation has on the value of the 
property.10 Since these factors were in favor of considering the two lots as 
one, the Court ruled that the combined lot was the relevant property in this 
case, and therefore, the Murrs had not been deprived of all use of that 
property.11  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
By 1972, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act required Wisconsin to 
develop a management program under for the federally designated St. 
Croix River.12 In compliance with the federal requirement, Wisconsin 
developed various rules to protect this area.13 The Murrs’ property, which 
was located on the Lower St. Croix River, was subject to Wisconsin’s 
“substandard lot rules.”14 Under these rules, lots with less than one acre of 
developable land (“substandard lots”) could not be sold if they were 
adjacent and under common ownership.15 A grandfather clause in the 
regulation allowed for the sale of adjacent substandard lots if the lots were 
separately owned on January 1, 1976, the effective date of the regulation.16 
The rules also included a clause that merged adjacent substandard lots 
under common ownership.17 The rules also allowed the local zoning 
authority to grant variances from the rules in special cases.18  
The Murrs’ property consists of two adjacent substandard lots that 
were independently owned when the substandard lot rules came into 
effect.19 Therefore, under the grandfather clause, the lots could be sold 
separately. The first lot (“lot F”) had a cabin, and the second lot (“lot E”) 
was undeveloped.20 A decade after the Murrs acquired the two lots, they 
decided to move the cabin on lot F and sell lot E to fund the project.21 
However, because the adjacent lots were now under common ownership, 
the local and state regulations prohibited the sale of lot E separate from lot 
F.22 The Murrs sought variances from the St. Croix County Board of 
Adjustment to allow the separate sale or use of the lots.23 The Board denied 
the request and the state courts upheld the Board’s decision based on the 
local rules prohibiting the sale of lot E separately.24 
                                                 
10. Id. at 1945. 
11. Id. at 1949. 
12.  Id. at 1940 (citing 41 Fed. Reg. 26237 (1976)). 
13.  Id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 30.27(l ) (1973)). 
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Id. 
17. Id. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
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The Murrs sued the State and County alleging the substandard lot 
rules amounted to a regulatory taking.25 The Circuit Court concluded that 
the Murrs had not been deprived of all of the “use and enjoyment of their 
property” because the Murrs had many available options for developing 
and using the land.26 Additionally, the court, considering the Murrs’ 
property as one single lot rather than two, found that the regulations did 
not significantly devalue the property.27  On appeal, the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals held that the takings analysis required that the court first 
determine the relevant property.28 The court determined that the lots could 
not be analyzed separately because the Murrs could not have reasonably 
expected that they could develop the lots separately when the substandard 
lot rules effectively merge the two lots.29 Therefore, the relevant property 
was the combined lot, and since the Murrs still had use of the lot, a taking 
had not occurred.30 After the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied 
discretionary review, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.31  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
  
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires just compensation 
when the government uses private property for a public use.32 While the 
Takings Clause does not expressly state how to handle the burden of a 
regulation on private property, Supreme Court jurisprudence has shown 
that a regulation can be so burdensome that it becomes a taking.33 The 
Court follows two guidelines for determining if a regulation is burdensome 
enough to become a taking. First, if a regulation prevents all economically 
beneficial or productive use of property, it will be considered a taking.34 
Second, a taking may still be found even when a regulation does not 
deprive property of all economically beneficial use based on an assessment 
of factors such as “(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental 
action.”35  
 
 
                                                 
25. Id. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. (citing Zealy v. Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996)). 
29.  Id.  
30.  Id. at 1941-42. 
31.  Id. at 1942. 
32.  Id. at 1942. 
33.  Id. at 1942 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 415 (1922)). 
34. Id. at 1942-43 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 
617 (2001) (citations omitted)). 
35.  Id. at 1943. (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 617 (citations omitted)). 
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A.  The Majority Opinion 
 
The central question before the Court was how to define the 
relevant unit of property for determining whether a regulatory taking has 
occurred.36 The Court will use the change in value of the relevant property 
due to the regulation in question to determine if the government action 
effects a taking.37 The Court stated that two concepts are important to 
defining the relevant property for a regulatory taking inquiry.38 First, a 
parcel should not be split up into artificial segments, such as “air rights,” 
to determine if the government deprived the owner of their rights in one 
segment of the parcel, but rather the parcel should be considered as a 
whole.39 Second, allowing state and local property regulations to define 
the unit of property in question would preclude landowners from 
challenging regulations that defined property boundaries inconsistently 
with “investment-backed expectations.”40 
The State and the Murrs both asked the Court for formalistic rules 
to determine the unit of property for considering the value lost due to the 
substandard lot rules.41 The State argued that the unit of property should 
be defined entirely by state law, which combined the Murrs’ property into 
one unit.42 The Court rejected the State’s argument, stating that it would 
leave “landowners without recourse against unreasonable regulations” that 
define property boundaries.43 The Murrs argued that the relevant property 
should be defined only by state lot lines, which would allow the economic 
damage of not being able to sell lot E to be considered without taking into 
account the change in value to lot F.44 The Court also rejected the Murrs’ 
argument because property lines are created by state laws, and therefore, 
the Murrs’ requested that the Court credit only certain state law that 
favored their interests.45 The Court concluded that formalistic rules 
suggested by the State and Murrs did not properly address the reasonable 
expectation of the landowner. 46 Instead, the Court used a multifactor 
standard to determine what a landowner’s reasonable expectation would 
be regarding the treatment of their property.47  
First, the Court gave substantial weight to how the land is bound 
by state and local law.48 The Court determined that a reasonable restriction 
                                                 
36.  Id. at 1943. 
37. Id. at 1943. 
38.  Id. at 1944. 
39.  Id. (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 130; Tahoe–Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002)). 
40.  Id. at 1944-45 (citing Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617). 
41.  Id. at 1946. 
42. Id. 
43.  Id. 
44. Id. at 1947. 
45. Id. 
46.  Id. at 1946. 
47. Id. at 1945. 
48.  Id. at 1948. 
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predating a landowner’s acquisition weighs in favor of a reasonable 
expectation that the land is subject to that restriction.49 In this case, the 
substandard lot rules only applied to the Murrs after the Murrs brought the 
two lots under common ownership.50 Murrs’ voluntary conduct of 
acquiring the two lots which subjected them to the regulation, and the 
reasonableness of the regulation itself, lead the Court to conclude that a 
landowner could reasonably expect the properties be treated as one.51 
Second, the Court looked at the physical characteristics of the 
land.52 The two lots were contiguous on their longest edge which, the 
Court concluded, supported the treatment of the lots as one.53 In addition, 
the Court determined that the Murrs could anticipate that their enjoyment 
of their property might be affected by regulations because the property was 
in an area that was subject to environmental regulations long before the 
Murrs’ ownership.54  
Third, the Court looked at the effect of the property rules on the 
value of the land.55 The Court concluded that the restriction against selling 
lot E independently was mitigated by the value lot E added to the property 
as an integrated whole.56 The merging of the lots, the Court noted, could 
provide more privacy and recreational space.57 In addition, the Court found 
that the financial value of the property as a whole would be worth more 
than the combined sum of the lots if they were sold individually.58 Again, 
the Court concluded that this factor weighed in favor of a reasonable 
expectation that the two lots would be treated as one unit.59  
Using these three factors, the Court concluded that a landowner 
would reasonably expect the two lots be treated as one, and thus, the lower 
courts were correct when deciding that the Murrs did not suffer a taking.60  
 
B.  Robert’s Dissent 
 
Chief Justice John Roberts, in dissent, agreed with the final 
conclusion of the majority, but disagreed with the method of reaching it.61 
In part, the dissent argued that the majority unfairly weighed the 
government’s regulatory interests over the rights of the landowner.62 
Roberts outlined the three steps in a takings analysis: (1) defining the 
relevant property, (2) determining if a taking has occurred, and (3) 
                                                 
49.  Id. 
50. Id. at 1948. 
51. Id.  
52. Id. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. 
57. Id. 
58.  Id. at 1949. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. 
61. Id. at 1950. 
62.  Id. at 1955. 
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calculating just compensation if a taking has occurred.63 Roberts stated 
that the second step already takes “the economic impact of the regulation,” 
“investment-backed expectations,” and the “character of the governmental 
action” into consideration.64 Roberts argued that by applying these factors 
to the definition of relevant property, the majority allowed government 
regulatory interests to be considered twice in the takings analysis instead 
of once.65 “Whenever possible, governments in regulatory takings cases 
will ask courts to aggregate legally distinct properties into one ‘parcel,’ 
solely for purposes of resisting a particular claim.”66   
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Murr v. Wisconsin marks a change in how the court will analyze 
a regulatory taking. When determining the relevant unit of property for a 
taking analysis, the Court relied on a three-factor standard to determine 
how a reasonable land owner would expect their property to be treated: (1) 
state and local law, (2) the physical characteristics of the land, and (3) the 
value loss due to the regulation.  The Court then used the reasonable 
expectation determined to define the unit of property. In this case, the 
reasonable expectation based on these factors was that the Murrs’ property 
be treated as one parcel. Therefore, there was no regulatory taking because 
the Murrs had not been deprived of the entire property.  
 
                                                 
63.  Id. at 1951. 
64. Id. at 1957 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S.at 124). 
 65. Id. at 1955. 
 66. Id. 
